on the broader question of the West and its constructions of the Rest.
But in addition to what might perhaps be common confusion concerning precisely who the "Rest" are, how does one go about determining the "West?" This is a particularly acute problem when one has chosen the focal point of the "Rest" that I have. The West, when it comes to the Muslim world, especially Iraq, is no monolith; there are divisions everywhere. Chasms separate France from the United States, England from Germany, conservatives from liberals, academics from journalists, faithful from nonbelievers, in their projections of the Muslim East. Our region of the world is, depending on which Western constituency you might be speaking to, a dark and violent place governed by a false religion and the traditions of an evil prophet,' a backwards and silly part of the world that cannot seem to come to terms with economic development and modernity, 2 a tragic story of good people of ordinarily moderate beliefs whose religion has been hijacked by forces of extremism, 3 or any number of permutations or 2. This appears to be a prevailing sentiment within particular European circles. The late Pim Fortuyn, for example, referred to Islam as fostering a "backwards culture. combinations of these.
Finally, I believed it important to avoid the perils of selfcongratulation. That is, I did not want to lead an exercise in scoffing at the ignorant hordes who did not know an Arab from a Muslim, a Turk from an Egyptian, a Shi'ite from a Sunni, and bemoan the fact that such hordes controlled our political and civic discourse, and how much better all would be if only we academics were heard. There is much that is wrong with our understandings of the Muslim Rest, as the story of Iraq I hope will demonstrate, that pervades every community, from the most learned to the least enlightened.
In fact, in many ways Western distortions of the Muslim East nearly always take the same form, irrespective of who in the West is doing the distorting. One common theme can be generally gleaned from any projections of the Muslim East in the West, in any Western country, among nearly every community, including, and perhaps especially, our own academic community. This is the perception of the near ubiquitous role of Islam and, more germane to my remarks, Islamic law, of a historic, medieval kind, in governing the legal order of Muslim states, including Iraq, in a manner that can be entirely distorting. In these brief remarks, I hope first to expose this bias, and then to provide at least rudimentary ideas on how law, both Islamic and secular, in the Muslim world might better be studied and understood, particularly by comparatists.
The general, conventional story of Iraq, told countless times in the media, is that Saddam Hussein, as an archsecularist, albeit a brutal one, was adept at holding back the rising waters of political Islam within his own nation, even as the movement's tentacles spread elsewhere across the broader Muslim world. 4 As a result, women were liberated and educated in Saddamist Iraq, the "envy of women across the Middle East," 5 In essence, what we learn from this story, in a way a template for the broader misunderstanding of the Muslim world, is that secular law in the region is illegitimate and viewed with suspicion, sustained only by brutal suppression of alternatives. Once alternatives are made available, Islam inserts itself, and a form of classical shari'a, that body of rules and norms derived from sacred text by the medieval jurists of the four schools of thought, becomes the law of the land. A similar story is told, for example, in Turkey, where the ruling party in the Muslim world's most secular state is repeatedly referred to in media outlets as a "moderate Islamist" party. 8 What then might be able to vindicate some form of secular rule in the Muslim world? This is where our scholars insert themselves where the media leaves off, and provide, as their answer to the conundrum, that same shari'a. If the Constitution, it is argued, declares that laws may not be passed that violate the core tenets, or unambiguous rulings, or certain provisions, of the shari'a, (the socalled repugnancy clauses) then the legislature becomes in essence an administrative authority, enacting secular codes but at the same time in doing so not only avoiding contravening God's rule, but 7. Judd, supra note 4; Dowd, supra note 4, Stromberg, supra note 6; RodgersMiller, supra note 6; Clover and Pelham, supra note 6. [Vol. 32:2 indeed acting in furtherance of the goals of God's Law. As to whether this is good or bad, the learned will differ, but it is the story.
The religion, above all, from a legal perspective, is fundamentally about the discovery of God's Law from sacred text, and all else must be justified on the basis of that.
Scholarly books are thus written about Egypt's repugnancy clause, 9 and tremendous focus is also placed on Iraq's. 10 Articles appear in respected law reviews decrying this phenomenon as the advent of a pernicious form of "theocratic constitutionalism,"" or in the alternative describing it hopefully, either as the initiation of rule of law reform in the benighted Abode of Islam 12 or as a means to balance juristic influence with popular sentiment in the determination of Islamic law.' 3 Reading elite constitutional scholarship on countries such as Egypt or Iraq, one might be forgiven for thinking that the entire document consisted of a single provision -the repugnancy clause.
From this notion that shari'a justifies the enactment of secular codes through Islamic constitutionalism, much apparently follows in the Western mind, as fruit from a poisonous tree. How to justify the trial and capture of Osama Bin Laden? Try him according to classical Islamic criminal rules! 14 How about the difficulty of reforming, in Iraq, the means by which security may be obtained for a loan, so that it operates in the manner that our own UCC Article 9 does? Simply create the rules in the manner that comply with Islamic finance! In the context of Iraq, where much of this discussion is focused, all of this might be interesting, if it sustained even casual interest within Iraq's legal community. I have been making a valiant, though at times unsuccessful, attempt to read through all of the decisions of the Supreme Federal Court of Iraq concerning matters of constitutionality, and I have yet to come upon a case that even cites Article 2 of the Constitution at all. Certainly there have been no reports of any serious engagement with its terms. There is a reason for this -the judges of Baghdad hardly wish to pronounce on shari'a in a manner that might vex the jurists of Najaf, particularly because the Constitution envisages judge and jurist working together on the Court, and no Iraqi judge I have met has the slightest proclivity toward working on a court with people that have no legal training and whose professional culture is entirely different. So long as the court stays out of shari'a, one judge told me, then Najaf will probably stay out of the court.
Whether or not this prognostication is true, we shall see, but on the notion that the Constitution's Article 2 at this point is hardly a matter of great concern to Iraqi lawyers and judges, there can be little doubt. Iraqi legal professionals routinely point to other legal disputes -concerning provincial elections, the fate of Kirkuk, restorations of property expropriated by the former regime, deBa'athification and the like. The mind-numbingly tedious sessions of Parliament, and the refreshingly brief opinions of the Federal Court do not, based on my own studied observations of the same, dwell excessively, if at all, on Article 2 of the Constitution even as they engage any number of other, important legal issues.
While other states, such as Egypt, might well have more developed jurisprudence concerning the repugnancy clause, the attention nevertheless tends to become much ado about relatively little. This is particularly because the Supreme Constitutional Court has taken enormous strides to limit the influence of the repugnancy clause, declaring it, for example, injusticable inasmuch as it concerns claims respecting prior enacted legislation.1 6 This makes the interest provision of the Civil Code valid until the legislature decides to "Islamicize" it. More than two decades have passed, and the [Vol. 32:2 legislature has done nothing of the sort. And so the taking of interest remains as legal today as it has ever been, notwithstanding the repugnancy clause.
This notion that the shari'a must be used to justify the laws of the Muslim world is even more misguided when we leave the world of constitutionalism. No Islamist party in Iraq suggested using Islamic criminal rules to try Saddam Hussein, and the divisions over his trial and execution divide neatly along sectarian lines, not levels of religiosity. In fact, no Iraqi legal professional I know, no matter how devout, no matter how Islamist, would find navigating medieval criminal shari'a any more comprehensible than Attorney General Mukasey would. The notion of Article 9 and Islamic finance seems even more bewildering in a state in which there are no significant Islamic banks, there have been no moves by any major Islamist party to ban the taking of interest on a loan, and the Minister of Finance, from the country's largest Islamist party, has agreed to reductions of state debt in a manner that recognizes a reduced, but very real, obligation to pay down debt, with interest.' 7 In other contexts, much the same conclusions can be drawn. During my last trip to Iraq, this past August, it remained as easy to get a beer in Baghdad as it is in Pennsylvania (which, by the way, is not very easy), and far easier in Suleymania than in New York (meaning the liquor stores were open well into the night, and seven days a week). Unveiled women were still the norm in Suleymania, still the significant minority in Baghdad. Secular law seems as firmly embedded as ever, in this state governed by Islamist parties. Even jurists tend to recognize these central tenets of the postcolonial social and legal order. When they get involved in affairs of the state, and they often do through the issuance of religious rulings or in the context of Friday sermons, they invariably address matters that hardly appear to be Islamic law in any classical sense -the insistence that the constitution be drafted, 18 watching on television), these rulings and sermons almost invariably do not call for state intervention. 20 If this is the case in Iraq, it is dramatically the more so in a state like Turkey, where the supposed Islamist party has proclaimed loudly, repeatedly and emphatically that the shari'a has no place in the law of the state. 21 None of this is to suggest that Islamic law, of a modem sort, is irrelevant in Muslim polities such as Iraq. In Iraq, Islamist parties have sought to amend the Personal Status Code in a manner that would have some effect on rulemaking in that particular legal field. 22 Islamic commerce can be important in private transactions among smaller merchants. 23 When the state was absent during particularly troublesome times in both Shi'a and Sunni areas, militias took control of areas and enforced their own version of Islamic law. 24 The fear of nonstate elements being able to do the same now, or in the future, remains acute. 25 Thus, shari'a is extremely important in non-state capacities, from private commerce to unregistered marriages to private enforcement of dress codes, all of which deserve greater study. However, the basic, secular legal foundation on which the state is founded -its training of legal professionals, its secular codes, its rulemaking authorities -are not under threat, not in Egypt, not in Pakistan, not even in Iraq, where Islamists rule. Inasmuch as shari'a plays a role in any Muslim state, it is because it is legitimized through state processes, that is, it is enacted by the state in a manner that complies with Hart's rule of recognition, and is then interpreted by secular lawyers with secular legal training.
That Shi'a jurists and their Shi'a constituencies would, as noted above, prefer shari'a to be developed in a different professional culture, that of the Najaf seminaries, goes a long way to explaining why so little has been enacted by way of Islamic statutes in contemporary Iraq and shari'a's primary force in Iraq lies in nonstate capacities. More Islamization might take place in Sunni countries such as Pakistan or Egypt, where there are weaker juristic influences, but the process is the same. Either the shari'a is a rule of the social order divorced from state law and using entirely private means of enforcement such as shaming and the like, or it is enacted according to secular state processes and applied by secular officials with secular training. The West, then, has the Muslim Rest precisely backwards. Shari'a does not justify secular law, but secular law can recognize and employ shari'a as part of the law. It is the state that grants legitimacy and authority to the shari'a as law, and not the reverse.
Moreover, not only are the notions of state supremacy over law are as firm as ever, but the substantive role of shari'a is also not very much different than it was prior to the invasion. The notion that creeping Islamism was somehow foreign to Saddamist rule is a false one. It was a Saddam era regulation that prevented women from obtaining a passport without the permission of a father or husband. 27 Saddam era rules added particularly harsh criminal punishments reminiscent of shari'a such as amputations, though hardly in a manner consistent with shari'a. All of these punishments have now been suspended. The Personal Status Code was always deeply influenced by shari'a, and amendments that made it even more so (unequal rights to inheritance, and a broader right for men to engage in polygamy) were enacted decades before the American invasion, and years before even Saddam assumed control. 28 These are often described as secular accommodations to the shari'a to appease Islamist forces. 29 But in Iraq the Islamists have taken over, and in Pakistan they certainly had a friend in power in the person of General Zia ul Haqq. Yet beyond nonstate applications of shari'a, the only possible changes being discussed (or in the case of Pakistan, enacted) would easily fall within the rubric of similar "accommodations."
As we all saw from the dramatic lawyers' demonstrations throughout Pakistan not long ago, the notion that the secular legal system carries no internal legitimacy absent some sort of authority from the shari'a is difficult to support. There is precious little to support the notion that we have been witnessing "the fall and rise of the Islamic state" in the Muslim world. Unfortunately, however, the West is slow to catch on to these trends. The manifestations of this are evident everywhere. I am asked at academic conferences how it can be that shari'a prohibits the taking of interest, yet Prince Talal invests in Citibank, as if every Muslim is bound first and foremost to the shari'a. A Bahraini female sprinter who wears a headscarf is described in television coverage as a Muslim, her female teammate, dressed more conventionally, yet as Muslim as the first, is not so described.
The preferred prerequisite for teaching an increasingly popular course on law school campuses, Islamic law, is not familiarity with contemporary Muslim legal systems, or a foreign law degree from a Muslim state, or even an advanced law degree of any kind, but rather a doctorate in Islamic studies, leaving most able to discuss at length thirteenth century theories on contract, yet less comfortable talking about Sanhuri's Civil Code, the template of Arab private law in the modem world. One might well ask precisely what is so legal about such a course, as far removed as it is from the law of the Muslim polities.
As to what can be done to deal with this rather dispiriting state of affairs, I have no panacea, and even if I did, I do not pretend to have the influence necessary to bring about the realization of my vision. Nevertheless, I can provide, I believe, at least some rudimentary ideas on the manner in which I believe the Muslim East might well be conceived and studied, at least among us 28 comparatists, that would be, at once, less exoticizing, less condescending and less distorting. I provide them in brief below. First, it seems to me fundamental that if one is to understand law in the Muslim world, the state's legal system must come first, and Islamic law, while important, understood within the context of that system. It is, after all, within the rubric of the state, either in gaps left in the state's legal machinery or in state law enactment, that Islamic law even exists. There are scholars who do this: Mark Cammack has given us excellent work on Islamic law in Indonesia; 30 Donald Horowitz has written a series of extraordinary articles on the importation of Islamic law into Malaysia in a largely similar manner; 31 and Dan Stigall has discussed Islamic law in Iraq to admirable effect. 32 Unfortunately, however, such material is dwarfed by the amount of work that simply wishes away the state in favor of the construction of medieval rules, many entirely obsolete, in some sort of political, social and economic vacuum. It is not entirely clear by what conception this material can even be considered "law" when so engaged. Certainly it is not any conception of law that lawyers in the Muslim world who I know would be familiar with.
Second, far more work needs to be done on matters concerning the Muslim East that are not directly related to shari'a. I find it quite ironic that in our quest to exoticize the Muslim East, so much focus is placed on the role of Islam, where most comparatists are least equipped to deal, to the derogation of matters in which many would be able to shed more light. How does de-Ba'athification compare to earlier efforts at de-Nazification? What model of property dispute resolution does the Iraq Property Claims Commission employ, and how does it relate to earlier efforts elsewhere in the world to deal with seemingly intractable disputes of this sort? Rather than unnatural and misguided focus on "theocratic constitutionalism," more work might be done as to the extremely broad federalism embodied in the Iraq constitution, as a model for state organization, or how precisely Iraq's extremely generous economic rights might well be given constitutional meaning. Rather than disquisitions on UCC Article 9 and Islamic finance, analysis of differing local models on obtaining security on a loan might well suggest different means through which polities balance the interests of debtors and various classes of creditors. There appears to me, at first glance, tremendous opportunity to explore issues greatly understudied in the Muslim world, to balance the near exclusive focus on shari'a concerns that are, in many though not all contexts, marginal.
Finally, I think all of our law schools would do well with a few more Muslim lawyers and legal professionals, and a few less experts on medieval jurisprudence. I commend Cornell Law School for offering my friend, Judge Raad Juhi, an opportunity to work there for a year, and have no doubt that the perspective he brings to Iraqi criminal law will be fresh and exciting. As the chief investigative judge during the trial of Saddam Hussein, he will, I am absolutely sure, have comparatively little to say that relates to the shari'a. More interactions of this sort are invaluable, so that law schools, among the Rest, might exchange ideas with their counterparts in the West, and distortions and confusions concerning the true state of law in the Muslim world thereby lessened, at least within our ivory tower.
